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Abstract10
The main incentives of blockchain technology are distribution and distributed change, consistency,11
and consensus. Beyond just being a distributed ledger for digital currency, smart contracts add12
transaction protocols to blockchains to execute terms of a contract in a blockchain network. Inter-13
blockchain (IBC) protocols define and control exchanges between different blockchains.14
The Isabelle Infrastructure framework has been designed to serve security and privacy for15
IoT architectures by formal specification and stepwise attack analysis and refinement1. A major16
case study of this framework is a distributed health care scenario for data consistency for GDPR17
compliance. This application led to the development of an abstract system specification of blockchains18
for IoT infrastructures.19
In this paper, we first give a summary of the concept of IBC. We then introduce an instantiation20
of the Isabelle Infrastructure framework to model blockchains. Based on this we extend this model21
to instantiate different blockchains and formalize IBC protocols. We prove the concept by defining22
the generic property of global consistency and prove it in Isabelle.23
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1 Introduction31
Inter-blockchain (IBC) protocols is a concept driven by industry. It serves to provide32
“reliable and secure communication between deterministic processes” [24] that run on inde-33
pendent blockchains or distributed ledgers. Practical application of IBC are for example the34
Cosmos Hub [5] “the first of thousands of interconnected blockchains” with the purpose of35
facilitating transfers between blockchains.36
A formal specification of IBC within a Higher Order Logic theorem prover like Isabelle37
has the advantage that it provides a very rigorous model of the IBC concepts enabling38
mechanically verified properties. In principle, from such a formalization, executable code39
into many standard programming languages like Haskell or Scala can be generated. However,40
such code generation would always be understood to provide only reference implementations.41
Moreover, the major insights from specifying a practice oriented concept like IBC is that42
1 In this paper we do neither illustrate attack tree analysis nor security refinement.
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the formal specification is mainly useful to provide a more abstract yet more precise model43
that carefully picks out the central concepts used within the application, here IBC. In doing44
this, the used methodology, here Isabelle, can provide as a framework existing work to45
immediately support the IBC specification. We rely heavily on the Isabelle Infrastructure46
framework [15] as an existing instantiation of Isabelle/HOL (which we will simply refer to47
as Isabelle within this paper). This framework offers a range of predefined concepts like48
Kripke structures and CTL, as well as state transition relations, actors, and policies that49
can be readily instantiated to the current application of IBC. Besides extracting a more50
abstract but precise specification of IBC, the resulting scientific advantage is to show that51
as a product of this process it becomes feasible to lay open crucial basic properties that52
result from the application domain (blockchain security). As the main result of this kind, we53
formally establish a global consistency property, define it formally on our IBC model and54
prove a consistency preservation theorem that shows the safety of our formal IBC semantics.55
The contributions of this paper are56
summarizing the main features of IBC into a logical conceptual model,57
building a formal model of IBC in Isabelle as an instance of the Isabelle Infrastructure58
framework but extending it with sets of infrastructures,59
illustrating the feasibility of the formal model by expressing a global consistency property60
and formally proving it in Isabelle.61
The last point seems to suggest that IBC can be seen as a “blockchain of blockchains”.62
1.1 Inter-blockchain protocols (IBC)63
In this section, we summarize the main concepts of the IBC following the practice-oriented64
description [24]: we refer to the relevant section of the principal documentation[24], giving65
precise reference to section numbers. Figure 1 is a copy an overview architectural sketch66
provided by the main specification [24].
Figure 1 Architecture of IBC[24].
67
One of the main abstractions used in IBC comprising its architectural description is the68
actor [24, Section 1.1.1] which is the same as a user. Instances given to exemplify this are: a69
human end user, a module or smart contract running on a blockchain, or an off-chain relayer70
process. This relayer process represents the logical core of the IBC. It is a process that is71
outside any of the blockchains (”off-chain” [24]) that is responsible for “relaying” IBC data72
packets between blockchains. It can scan their states and submit data.73
The notion of state machine is very central in IBC: the terms machine, chain, blockchain, or74
ledger are used interchangeably [24, Section 1.1.2] to denote a state machine that implements75
part or all of the IBC. In using the Isabelle Infrastructure framework – whose core part is76
the formal definition of a state machine semantics through a state transition relation – we77
follow this important architectural spirit.78
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Consensus is not explicitly defined but somewhat implicitly by the notion of consensus79
algorithm “the protocol used by the set of processes operating a distributed ledger to come80
to agreement on the same state” [24, 1.1.5] where “Consensus state” is defined next as81
information about the “state of a consensus algorithm” [24, 1.1.6]. We can safely understand82
consensus to mean the agreement of the actors on the next state with respect to the state83
transition relation.84
1.2 Isabelle Infrastructure framework85
The Isabelle Infrastructure is built in the interactive generic theorem prover Isabelle/HOL86
[19]. As a framework, it supports formalization and proof of systems with actors and policies.87
It originally emerged from verification of insider threat scenarios but it soon became clear88
that the theoretical concepts, like temporal logic combined with Kripke structures and a89
generic notion of state transitions were very suitable to be combined with attack trees into a90
formal security engineering process [3] and framework [9].91
Figure 2 gives an overview of the Isabelle Infrastructure framework with its layers of92
object-logics – each level below embeds the one above showing the novel contribution of93
this paper in blue on the top. The formal model of IBC in Isabelle uses the Isabelle





Figure 2 Generic Isabelle Infrastructure framework applied to Inter-blockchain protocols (IBC).
94
Infrastructure framework instantiating it by reusing its concept of actors for users, processes95
running on blockchains, or relayers running off-chain. Technically, an Isabelle theory file96
IBC.thy builds on top of the theories for Kripke structures and CTL (MC.thy), attack trees97
(AT.thy), and security refinement (Refinement.thy). Thus all these concepts can be used98
to specify the formal model for IBC, express relevant and interesting properties and conduct99
interactive proofs (with the full support of the powerful and highly automated proof support100
of Isabelle). The IBC theory itself is an adaptation of the Infrastructure theory of the Isabelle101
Infrastructure framework and reuses (or slightly adapts) existing concepts. In the remainder102
of this paper, we introduce the model that we conceived for IBC. All Isabelle sources are103
available online [12].104
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2 IBC in Isabelle105
2.1 Overview106
In the following, we give a detailed description of the central parts of the formal Isabelle107
theory of IBC, pointing out and motivating special design decisions. In addition to the short108
general intro to the Isabelle Infrastructure framework of the previous section, we provide109
explanations of all used Isabelle specific specification concepts on the fly.110
The IBC is supposed to work for any type of blockchain, for example, Bitcoin or Ethereum,111
therefore the formal model abstracts from specific details of a specific blockchain. Similar to112
the IBC specification [24], the Isabelle formalization focuses on the central IBC concepts113
as depicted in Figure 1: ledgers, actors or modules, respectively, and the relayer process114
interacting via the IBC protocol with the modules within the distributed ledgers. In our115
formal model based on the Isabelle Infrastructure framework, we represent each blockchain116
as an infrastructure containing nodes on which the modules (actors) are running. Data items117
are assigned to actors. The ledgers of each infrastructure keep control over the data items.118
That is, a ledger is a unique assignment that controls the access to a data item and keeps a119
record of where the data item resides within this and other blockchains. The IBC enables120
just that: a unified view over a whole range of heterogeneous blockchains that exchange data121
consistently. Therefore, our formal model goes beyond the usual application of the Isabelle122
Infrastructure framework, e.g. [8], and considers sets of infrastructures (representing different123
blockchains).124
2.2 Ledgers125
Actors are a general concept provided by the Isabelle Infrastructure framework and can be126
used directly to represent the actor concept in IBC.127
128
typedecl actor129
type_synonym identity = string130
consts Actor :: string ⇒ actor131132
Similar to the general Infrastructure framework, actors can perform actions. However, in133
this instantiation to IBC we redefine the actions representing the central activities of the134
relayer scanning each blockchain’s state and submitting transactions (see Section 2).135
136
datatype action = scan | submit137138
The Decentralized Label Model (DLM) [17] allows labeling data with owners and readers.139
We also adopt this definition of security labeled data as already formalised in [9]. Labeled140
data is given by the type dlm × data where data can be any data type.141
142
type_synonym data = string143
type_synonym dlm = identity × identity set144145
One major achievement of a blockchain is that it acts like a distributed ledger, that is,146
a global accounting book. A distributed ledger is a unique consistent transcript keeping147
track of protected data across a distributed system. In our application, the ledger must148
mainly keep track of where the data resides for any labeled data item. To express the system149
requirement that processing may not change the security and privacy labels of data, we150
introduce a type of security and privacy preserving functions.151
152
typedef label_fun = {f :: dlm × data ⇒ dlm × data.153
∀ x. fst x = fst (f x)}154155
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We formalize a ledger thus as a type of partial functions that maps a data item to a pair of156
the data’s label and the set of locations where the data item is registered. Since all function157
in HOL are total, we use a standard Isabelle way of representing partial functions using the158
type constructor option. This type constructor lifts every type α to the type α option159
which consists of the unique constant None and the range of elements Some x for all x∈ α.160
161
type_synonym ledger = data ⇒ (dlm × node set)option162163
Since the type ledger is a function type, it automatically constrains each data item d in its164
domain to have at most one range element Some(l,N), that is, at most one valid data label165
l of type dlm and a list of current blockchain nodes N at which this data item is transcribed.166
167
lemma ledger_def_prop: ∀ lg:: ledger. ∀ d:: data.168
lg d = None | (∃! l. (∃! L. lg d = Some(l, L)))169170
In an earlier application of the Isabelle Infrastructure framework to IoT security and171
privacy[15], we established a formal notion of blockchain. However, there we used a more172
explicit logical characterization in an Isabelle type definition which creates additional proof173
effort and makes formulas more complex. The current representation of the ledger type174
as a partial function type is more concise and implicitly carries the requested uniqueness175
properties. Note that the defining property of the ledger type is now proved from the used176
type constructors by the above lemma instead of being specified into the type as in the earlier177
formalization [15].178
2.3 Infrastructures as blockchains179
The datatype sc_fun formalizes any action that is sent or received between different180
blockchains and may have effects on the labeled data. Therefore the inputs to the send and181
receive messages are two identities of sender and receiver as well as the dlm label and the182
concerned data.183
184
datatype sc_fun = Send identity × identity × dlm × data185
| Receive identity × identity × dlm × data186187
In addition to specifying the potential types of smart contracts, we need to provide a way188
of keeping track of the transactions that are executed within a blockchain. To this end,189
we define the following type of transaction_record which is a list of all executed smart190
contracts.191
192
type_synonym transaction_record = sc_fun list193194
The central component that builds the system state is an infrastructure. Since we use195
the Isabelle Infrastructure framework, we consider blockchains as infrastructures. The196
essential architecture of such an infrastructure is a simple graph of blockchain nodes on197
which the processes (actors) reside given as the first component (node ×node)set of the198
below datatype igraph. Besides this basic architecture, this infrastructure graph also stores199
the other components of the blockchain. The second input is a function that assigns a set200
of actor identities to each node in the graph representing the current location of the actors.201
The next input associates actors to a pair of string sets by a pair-valued function whose first202
range component is a set describing the credentials in the possession of an actor and the203
second component is a set defining the roles the actor can take on. An infrastructure graph204
also allows assigning a string to each location to represent some current state information of205
that location. Finally, the ledger is added as a separate component as well as the transaction206
record.207
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208
datatype igraph =209
Lgraph (node × node)set210
node ⇒ node set211




Corresponding projection functions for each of the components of an infrastructure graph217
are provided. They are omitted here for brevity but are available in the online version [12]);218
they are named gra for the actual set of pairs of locations, agra for the actor map, cgra for219
the credentials, and lgra for the state of a location ledgra for the ledger component in the220
graph and trec for the transaction record. Infrastructures contain an infrastructure graph221





[igraph , location] ⇒ apolicy set227228
There are projection functions graphI and delta when applied to an infrastructure return229
the graph and the policy, respectively.230
Policies specify the expected behaviour of actors of an infrastructure. We define the231
behaviour of actors using a predicate enables: within infrastructure I, at location l, an232
actor h is enabled to perform an action a if there is a pair (p,e) in the local policy of l –233
delta I l projects to the local policy – such that action a is in the action set e and the234
policy predicate p holds for actor h.235
236
enables I l h a = ∃ (p,e) ∈ delta I l. a ∈ e ∧ p h237238
Compared to the applications of the Isabelle Infrastructure framework, e.g. [8], we do not239
make use of policies to model the constraints of our application. However different to previous240
applications, the IBC challenges the framework in other ways leading to slight extensions.241
2.4 Relayer and set of blockchains242
To model the relayer, we also use infrastructures: the relayer is a distinguished infrastructure.243
It could be thought of as another distributed application with various relayer processes to244
avoid bottlenecks but for simplicity, we assume that there is one specific actor ”relayer”245
that resides on a specific node in the relayer infrastructure.246
We express protocols as traces of execution steps of IBC transaction steps, that is,247
lists of smart contracts sc_fun (see previous section). Using traces of execution steps to248
represent protocols, follows the classical method of the inductive approach to security protocol249
verification originally devised by Paulson [22] and already successfully used for the Isabelle250
Infrastructure framework, for example, [13] and more recently [10, 11].251
252
datatype ibc_protocol = Protocol sc_fun list set253254
The datatype blockchainset puts together the IBC protocol as a triple: as the first255
element it includes the IBC protocol, the second element is the list of infrastructures where256
each element is one blockchain involved in the IBC, and the third element is a single257
distinguished infrastructure, the relayer.258
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259
datatype blockchainset = Infs ibc_protocol260
infrastructure list261
infrastructure262263
To round off these new datatypes, we provide additional projection functions and constructors.264
For a given blockchain Il, the projection trcs Il returns the sc_fun list set representing265
the protocol, the projection the_Il returns the list of infrastructures of all involved block-266
chains, and relayer Il gives the distinguished infrastructure, the third element, which is267
the relayer infrastructure. To facilitate handling of data transactions, we define some update268
functions: the function application upd_ld d lN I updates a ledger at the data point d to269
now contain the pair lN of a dlm label and a set of nodes of residences of the data. Scaling270
this up to the level of infrastructures, the function application upd_Il d lN Il updates all271
blockchains in the infrastructure list of the blockchainset Il using the former ledger update272
upd_ld. A function replace allows to replace an infrastructure I in a blockchainset Il. See273
the online resources [12] for technical details and implementations of these definitions.274
2.5 Consensus275
The consensus algorithm may be different for each blockchain employed in the IBC. Therefore,276
we cannot make any assumptions at the general specification level of the IBC about it. Yet,277
we still want to use it in the description of the IBC protocol semantics. Therefore, we apply278
a trick: we declare Consensus to be a constant at the level of the specification of the IBC.279
280
consts Consensus :: infrastructure ⇒ blockchainset ⇒ blockchainset281282
In Isabelle this means that Consensus is a function mapping an infrastructure and a system283
state of type blockchain to blockchain but there is no semantics attached to this constant.284
The constant is part of the theory IBC.thy and can be used in it like any other defined285
element but it has no meaning. However, a semantics can be later attached to it in an286
application of the IBC theory to specific blockchains. This could be done in the current287
context for example using a definition in a locale [14].288
289
locale ConsensusExample =290
fixes cons_algo :: infrastructure ⇒ blockchainset ⇒ infrastructure291
defines cons_algo_def: cons_algo I Il = ...292
fixes Consensus :: infrastructure ⇒ blockchainset ⇒ blockchainset293
defines Consensus_def: Consensus I Il = replace (cons_algo I Il) I Il294295
The predicate Consensus redefines the semantics within the locale ConsensusExample. The296
first locale definition is omitted here for simplicity. We could imagine that it is a description297
of a consensus algorithm that can depend on all the state constituents, like actors, nodes, and298
policies of the blockchain I but also of the surrounding blockchainset including the relayer299
state and the current protocol state. The definition of the constant Consensus lifts the300
algorithm to the blockchain by using the replace function defined as part of the infrastructure301
for blockchainsets (see Section 2.4 or refer to the Isabelle code [12]).302
2.6 IBC state transition semantics303
The semantics of the IBC state machines is defined by a state transition relation over304
blockchain sets. That is, we define a syntactic infix notation Il → Il’ to denote that305
blockchain sets Il and Il’ are in this relation.306
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307
inductive state_transition_in ::308
[blockchainset , blockchainset] ⇒ bool "(_ → _)"309310
The rules of the inductive definition state_transition_in allow the definition of the311
intended behaviour of the relayer scanning an arbitrary blockchain (see Section 2). The312
relayer stores the results in its own transaction record. The following rule scan is the first313
of two inductive definition rules defining the transition relation →: if an infrastructure I314
is in the blockchainset Il, the actor (process, module) resides at node n in the graph G315
of I; R is the relayer and thus enabled to scan. The follow up state Il’ of Il is given by316
extending any current protocol trace l using the specially defined function insertp by the317
transaction Send(a,b,(a,as), d). Also the relayer’s trace record trec R is extended by318
the same transaction.319
320
scan : inbc I Il =⇒ G = graphI I =⇒ a @G n =⇒ n ∈ nodes G =⇒321
R = graphI (relayer Il) =⇒ r @R n’ =⇒ n’ @R nodes R =⇒322
relrole (relayer Il) (Actor r) =⇒323
enables I n (Actor r) scan =⇒324
ledgra G d = Some ((a, as), N) =⇒ r ∈ as =⇒325
R’ = Infrastructure326
(Lgraph (gra R)(agra R)(cgra R)(lgra R)327
(( ledgra R)(d := Some((a, as),N)))328
(trec R))329
(delta (relayer Il)) =⇒330
l ∈ trcs Il =⇒ Consensus I Il = Il ’ =⇒331
Il ’ = insertp ((Send(a,b,(a,as), d)) # l) (replrel R’ Il)332
=⇒ Il → Il ’333334
Additionally, the relayer can submit data onto an arbitrary blockchain (see Section 2). The335
second rule submit of → defines its semantics: between the infrastructures I and J which336
are both in the blockchain set Il the relayer R can submit data d from an owner a to an337
owner b if the ledger component ledgra R of the relayer’s infrastructure R is updated to338
the new owner in both blockchains. The update is achieved using the function update :=339
of Isabelle’s function theory updating the point d to the new value Some((b, bs), N). In340
the construction of the next state blockchainset Il’ the specially defined update operators341
mentioned in Section 2.4 are used: replrel for updating the relayer and bc_upd for the342
infrastructure list representing the “client” blockchains. Note the latter realizes the consistent343
update in both involved infrastructures I and J.344
345
submit : G = graphI I =⇒ inbc I Il =⇒ a @G n =⇒ n ∈ nodes G =⇒346
ledgra G d = Some ((a, as), N) =⇒347
H = graphI J =⇒ inbc J Il =⇒ b @H n’ =⇒ n’ ∈ nodes H =⇒348
ledgra H d = Some ((a, as), N) =⇒349
R = graphI (relayer Il) =⇒ r @R n’’ =⇒ n’’ ∈ nodes R =⇒350
relrole (relayer Il) (Actor r) =⇒351
enables J n’ (Actor r) submit =⇒352
r ∈ as =⇒353
R’ = Infrastructure354
(Lgraph (gra R)(agra R)(cgra R)(lgra R)355
(( ledgra R)(d := Some((b, bs),N)))356
(trec R))357
(delta (relayer Il)) =⇒358
Il’ = insertp (Receive(a,b,(a,as),d)# l)359
(replrel R’ (bc_upd d ((b,as), N) Il)) =⇒360
F. Kammüller and U. Nestmann 23:9
Consensus J Il = Il ’361
=⇒ Il → Il’362363
The real advantage of the Isabelle Infrastructure framework comes into play when using364
the possibility of instantiation of axiomatic type classes provided by Isabelle. Since state365
transitions have been defined by an axiomatic type class in the framework within the theory366
for Kripke structures and CTL, we can now instantiate blockchainsets as state and thereby367
inherit the entire logic, constructors and theorems.368
369
instantiation blockchainset :: state370371
3 Global consistency372
To illustrate the use of the abstract formal model of IBC presented in this paper, we show373
that we can exhibit an important property: global consistency. That is, if the IBC scans and374
submits between blockchains it must not introduce inconsistencies.375
Expressing this property alone represents a proof of concept since it shows that our IBC376
model is detailed enough to capture explicitly the notion of consistent data representation377
across different blockchains. Proving the property is a non-trivial contribution (see proof378
scripts [12]) that helped exhibiting a range of useful auxiliary definitions and lemmas as we379
will highlight in this section when discussing the global consistency theorem. The proofs were380
greatly helped by the recent advances in proof automation in Isabelle using sledgehammer [21].381
The fact that the property is provable shows that the model and in particular its semantics382
conform to the intuition described in [24]. The formalization and proof also highlight the383
pros and cons of our model as discussed in the Conclusions in Section 4.384
We first define global consistency as the property that the individual ledgers in each385
blockchain in an IBC blockchainset agree on the data, that is, they all hold consistent386
information about the access control of the data (the first part of type dlm of the ledgra387
output (see Section 2.2)) and where the data resides: the set of nodes that are the second388
component of the ledgra output.389
390
Global_consistency Il = (∀ I I’. inbc I Il → inbc I’ Il →391
(∀ d. (ledgra (graphI I’) d) = (ledgra (graphI I) d)))392393




global_consistency Il =⇒ (Il → Il ’) =⇒ global_consistency Il ’398399
Preservation of global consistency guarantees that any transaction happening within IBC400
preserves one consistent view over all data, their access control, and residence. If initially401
data is not visible on all blockchains, not all ledgers are equal. However, if eventually data has402
traveled across, all ledgers become the same: the blockchainset becomes like one blockchain:403
a “blockchain of blockchains”.404
4 Conclusions, related work, and outlook405
In this paper, we have provided an abstract formal model of the Inter-blockchain protocol406
(IBC) [24] as an instantiation of the Isabelle Infrastructure framework. We have detailed the407
formal presentation in Isabelle and the extensions to the Isabelle Infrastructure framework,408
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most notably by defining sets of (heterogeneous) blockchains including protocols and a409
distinguished relayer. The abstraction we conceived for this model has been first validated410
by a proof of concept by sketching how the abstract notion of Consensus can be instantiated411
by a locale (Section 2.5). Furthermore, we have defined a global consistency property over412
blockchainsets proving that our abstraction yields the desired expressivity (Section 3). We413
have proved a preservation theorem for global consistency in Isabelle. Summarizing, our414
model allows to prove meta-theoretical results but is not too abstract to allow instantiation415
onto concrete blockchains and their Consensus algorithms. As a more general thought, the416
dealings with global consistency seem to suggest that IBC creates a blockchain of blockchains.417
4.1 Related Work418
Relevant examples for the investigation of formal support for blockchains and smart contracts419
can be found in abundance in the proceedings of the first FMBC workshop [2]. We only420
discuss the few most closely related ones from there since others are either focusing on specific421
blockchains (unlike the generic IBC we consider) or are differing in the formal approach (not422
using theorem provers and thus not addressing the same level of expressivity and assurance).423
A range of works formalizes smart contracts typical for the Ethereum virtual machine.424
For example, using the K framework [23], the Lem language [7], and F* [6]. We focus here on425
the work that has been performed in the K-framework [23]. The K-framework is a semantics426
framework enabling to produce executable operational semantics for programming languages.427
K also provides tools like parsers, interpreters, model-checkers and program verifiers. It428
has been applied to provide a verification environment for the Ethereum Virtual Machine429
EVM [20] which is useful for verifying programme modules within Ethereum’s smart contract430
systems, for example, Ethereum’s Name Service (ENS) [25].431
In comparison to those dedicated verification environments for specific blockchains, like432
Ethereum, our formal model strongly abstracts from technical detail. This abstraction is433
necessary to accommodate a global view that allows to reason about the communication434
between a heterogeneous set of blockchains.435
A few works use model checkers and SMT solvers, for example [4]. Deductive verification436
platforms like Why3 [11,13] have been also used for smart contracts. Interactive proof437
assistants (e.g. Isabelle/HOL or Coq) have been used before for modeling and proving438
properties about Ethereum and Tezos smart contracts [1].439
Very related is the work by Nielsen and Spitters on Smart Contract Interactions in440
Coq [18]. The authors construct a model of smart contracts that allows for inter-contract441
communication generalizing over depth-first execution blockchains like Ethereum and breadth-442
first execution blockchains like Tezos. They use Coq’s functional language Galina to express443
smart contracts. Besides the obvious difference of being a Coq development rather than an444
Isabelle development, we address the high level protocol language IBC instead of focusing on445
generalized smart contracts.446
Maybe even more closely related is the work on the specification of the dedicated security447
framework Cap9 in Isabelle [16]. Compared to us it focuses again on the expression of smart448
contracts and does not have the inter-blockchain aspect like our IBC.449
4.2 Outlook450
The global consistency preservation theorem proves the concept of the IBC specification451
and also shows that the formalization in itself is a useful experiment: extracting a closed452
abstract model of the IBC from the technical specification [24] has immediately produced453
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the consistency question. The abstraction allowed to define semantics in which a strong454
global consistency theorem could be proved within Isabelle in reasonably short time. It455
should be understood that these are first steps that mainly serve to prove the concept456
of using the Isabelle Infrastructure framework for advancing the IBC. A clear next step457
is to elaborate the sketched application example of Section 2.5 of a concrete blockchain458
and its consensus algorithm. A much more challenging next step is to refine the model459
by elaborating a more concrete IBC protocol example by instantiation of the ibc_prot460
component of the blockchainset type. This would be a fruitful future avenue for applied461
research in collaboration with the designers of IBC.462
The notions of attack trees and security refinement have not been applied in463
this application of the Isabelle Infrastructure framework but can be seen in other464
applications, for example to auction protocols [13], GDPR [8], or IoT security [9].465
Nevertheless, the current application has brought about much improvement on466
the formalization of the ledger datatype as well as instantiating the generic state467
of the framework to sets of infrastructures and defining their state transition.468
The Isabelle Infrastructure framework subsumes the earlier Isabelle Insider469
framework, for example [13]. Thus there is the possibility to reason about470
malicious agents that are in the group of trusted participants. This could be471
used to reason about participants that do not comply to the IBC protocol and472
in terms of Consensus it would enable reasoning on Byzantine fault tolerance.473
Using attack tree analysis and security refinement in a security engineering cycle474
[15] could then be used to develop secure IBC solutions.475
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